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What might it mean to live an authentic life in the early twenty-
first century? What ethical coordinates would need to be calibrated 
to enable one to declare her/himself authentically positioned within 
subjectivity? Despite the imprecations of a profitable sector of the 
publishing industry that the path to authentic living is lined with 
tomes preaching self-help and self-realization, late-twentieth-century 
philosophical accounts on the subject are altogether more skeptical 
about the interdependence of selfhood and authenticity. The "post-
deconstructive subject"(Critchley 51) that has risen to prominence 
since the 1960's linguistic turn is characterized more by fragmentation 
and exteriority than by coalescence around a core and transcendent 
inner substance. Indeed, the very notion of an authentic subjectiv-
ity begs the quotation marks that I will refuse to apply in this es-
say, bringing with it overtones of an unreflective universalism that 
poststructuralism, feminism, postcolonialism and postmodernism 
have trained critics in the humanities to distrust. Yet, as we enter 
the second decade of the twenty-first century, the reemergence of 
authenticity as an ethical marker of contemporary subjectivity is 
gaining significant traction. 
At the level of daily Western praxis, the growing popularity of 
organic consumerism, ecological politics, lifestyles more attuned to 
natural processes and nostalgia chic—all part of what David Boyle calls 
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the "New Realism" (15)—speak of an appetite, especially among the 
middle classes, for the genuine and unvarnished. We have entered 
what Charles Taylor describes as "the Age of Authenticity" (Secular 
473). We are feeling Alain Badiou's "passion for the real" (39) and 
experiencing David Shields's "reality hunger." Taylor characterizes 
the current ethic of authenticity as the product of the twin move-
ments toward individualism and away from social communitarianism 
in the second half of the twentieth century, movements embedded 
by the socio-political neoliberalism of the Regan-Thatcher era. Since 
the 1960s:
we see a steady spread of what I have called the culture 
of "authenticity." I mean the understanding . . . that each 
one of us has his/her own way of realizing our humanity, 
and that it is important to find and live out one's own, as 
against surrendering to conformity with a model imposed 
on us from outside, by society, or the previous generation, 
or religious or political authority. (Secular 475)
This imperative to ethical self-determination, to the deliberate rejec-
tion of socially symbolic systems in favor of self-discovered or intuited 
models of being, has brought about a "simplified expressivism" whose 
primary tenet is to "find yourself, realize yourself, release your true 
self" (Secular 475). The reduction of a complex existentialist fun-
damental to a solipsistic mantra of self-becoming has led, for David 
Shields, to a paradoxical self-dispossession. For him, the artistic ex-
pression of this philosophy is characterized less by plenitude than by 
disappointment: "we've lost something along the way and are going 
back to try to find it, but we don't know what that thing is. . . . We're 
clinging to anything that seems 'real' or organic or authentic" (90).
Postmodern culture, with its fetishization of the mash-up, the 
pastiche, and the recombinant, mirrors the contemporary vision 
of subjectivity as performative and protean, and Shields's anxiety 
is that all the emphasis on being oneself—in an aesthetic environ-
ment where to be oneself is to be an imitation of others—produces 
a bewildering double-think that achieves exactly the opposite of 
the expressivist ideal. To be oneself without being one self calls the 
whole ideal of expressivism into question. Given the uncoupling of 
self-understanding from the validating structures of religious discipline 
and social collectivism, how one goes about locating an authentic hub, 
and testing that against any model other than a subjective pathos, is 
philosophically problematic. And yet, a generation after the Linguistic 
Turn, the lure of the authentic as an absolute mode of being has not 
only not diminished, but has reasserted itself as an insistent trope 
of contemporary lived and aesthetic practice. Taking British fiction 
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since 2000 as its focus, this essay will explore the prevalence and 
diversity of this theme and, through the examination specifically of 
Tom McCarthy's Remainder and Steven Hall's The Raw Shark Texts, 
will argue that the current anxiety of authenticity stems from the 
unresolved tension between the expressivist ethic and the horizon 
of the postdeconstructive subject. 
The idea of the authentic as a quality of the material world has 
been current throughout British postmodern writing: one need look 
no further than John Fowles' The French Lieutenant's Woman (1969), 
Graham Swift's Waterland (1983), Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains 
of the Day (1989), or A.S. Byatt's Possession (1990).The ideal of 
authenticity as a way of living has become increasingly important in 
the last decade, a period critics such as Steven Connor identify with 
postmodernism's turn to the ethical. Work like W.G. Sebald's Austerlitz 
(2001), which dramatizes the reconstitution of a self-congruent life 
narrative, suggests a closer engagement with the human need to 
believe in the authentic as an endpoint of personal growth. It is an 
engagement that is identifiable, in different ways and for different 
reasons, in texts as diverse as Zadie Smith's White Teeth (2000), 
Niall Griffith's Sheepshagger (2001), Andrew O'Hagan's Be Near Me 
(2006), Rachel Cusk's The Bradshaw Variations (2009) and Monica 
Ali's Untold Story (2011). The implausibility of achieving authentic-
ity in an age of over-sentimentalised celebrity culture is the subject 
of Will Self's rewrite of Oscar Wilde: Dorian: An Imitation (2002), 
while Jeannette Winterson's The.Powerbook (2000) suggests that 
a route toward a fusion of authentic and inauthentic selfhood may 
be found through the kinds of promiscuous identity exchange made 
possible by digital communication. The cynicism and technological 
utopianism of the last two examples are, however, uncharacteristic 
of recent fiction's striving to marry the desire for the real with the 
legacy of postmodernism's fascination with the simulacral. That is 
characterized much more by the work of Hall and McCarthy, where the 
contemporary conviction in the conditioned and exteriorized nature of 
identity is counterbalanced by a residual belief in the transtemporal, 
self-identical subject. The questions that will underpin the discussion 
of their novels revolve around whether the notion of the authentic—
as it is understood in existentialist philosophy—can remain relevant 
beneath the challenge of the decentered subject. Is it possible to 
accommodate the self-congruent subject with the deconstructed 
self of postmodernism, and if so, what manner of authenticity could 
emerge? These questions necessitate a brief explanation of two 
philosophical models of authentic being that are widely articulated 
in contemporary culture.
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Lionel Trilling, in his influential account of modernity's engage-
ment with the subject, Sincerity and Authenticity, posits the inter-
pretation of authenticity as "the downward movement through all 
the cultural superstructures to some place where all movement ends, 
and begins" (12). He additionally claims that authenticity requires a 
"strenuous moral experience . . . [an] exigent conception of the self 
and of what being true to it consists in, and a less acceptant and 
genial view of the social circumstances of life" (11). This emphasis 
on a rootedness that demands high standards of moral conduct and 
a psychological distance from social factors encapsulates three key 
aspects of the philosophical tradition of authenticity: its belief in the 
core of agency; its requirement for a moral or ethical dimension; and 
the potential for conflict between the needs of the individual and the 
demands of the community. All accounts of authenticity fundamentally 
revolve around variations of these criteria and disagree to varying 
degrees on the relative importance of the separate elements.1 Though 
critics agree that authenticity is a by-product of the social and intel-
lectual conditions that gave birth to post-Enlightenment modernity, 
for the purposes of this essay, I will make the distinction between 
the older tradition of authenticity that starts with Rousseau, and the 
more recent post-Nietzschean formulation as a means of determining 
how they are interpreted in contemporary culture. 
At the heart of Romanticism's authentic is what Charles Guignon 
describes as "the attempt to recover a sense of oneness and whole-
ness that appears to have been lost with the rise of modernity". The 
"truth" of the self cannot be accessed through rational contemplation 
or scientific enumeration, but only "by a total immersion in one's own 
deepest and most intense feelings" (51). The sine qua non of this 
view is the foundational integrity of the human self, a fullness that 
correlates directly and organically to the natural world, but is rent 
by the submission of its instinct and desire to the communitarian 
good. Thrown into the service of the other, the Romantic self must, 
in order to achieve authentic self-understanding and freedom from 
the imposition of external codes of conduct, reject its duty to others, 
thereby becoming paradoxically self-alienated. As such, "Hegel says 
that it has made a step in progress. He puts it that the existence of 
the self 'on its own account is, strictly speaking, the loss of itself'" 
(Trilling 38). The forging of an authentic spirit through the uncoupling 
of conduct from socially received opinion and values entails the active 
engagement of ethical judgement and responsibility in the shaping 
of a self, but it presupposes the possibility of a reconstituted whole 
on the blueprint of a premodern nostalgia. This model of authentic-
ity as a form of biological inheritance is refigured in the twentieth 
century's understanding of psychological science as an uncovering of 
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the palimpsest of influences and intersubjective relations to reveal the 
dialectic between the subject's drives and instincts. The core tenet 
of this ideal of authenticity, then, directs us "to realize and be that 
which you already are, the unique, definitive traits, already there 
within you" (Guignon 4).
The other significant strand within the tradition of authenticity is 
summed up for Alessandro Ferrara in the etymological history of the 
term: "In Greek "authentikós" derives from 'eautón' and 'theto,' where 
'theto' is etymologically related to 'thesis.' Thus 'authentic' refers to 
individuals who 'posit themselves' or, more freely, 'set themselves 
as a thesis'" (15). As opposed to the biological model of uncovering 
and nurturing that which already exists beneath a carapace of social 
conformist values, this construction accentuates the authentic as part 
of the treatment of the subject as a working negotiation of incessant 
change and ethical challenge. The authentic individual, by this token, 
exhibits "the congruency of the well-formed work of art" (Ferrara 10), 
revealing superstructural integrity in her/his willingness to cohere 
around a consistent logic of the self instead of a nostalgic longing for 
an illusory wholeness. The individual who "posits themselves" must 
necessarily regard her/himself simultaneously as both inner and outer, 
as a self-constant being generated sui generis, and as a product 
sculpted from the torrent of public and private experiences that as-
sail them. This project should not be read as the artificial imposition 
of a fiction of selfhood—such a judgement error would lead one into 
inauthenticity—but as the process by which one becomes what one 
is, to paraphrase Nietzsche. While this retrenchment to an apparently 
pre-given identity indicates Nietzsche's debt to the biological tradition 
of Rousseau, Jacob Golomb warns against collapsing the two: "To 
become 'what we are' is not to live according to our so-called 'innate 
nature,' but to create ourselves freely. To that end we have to know 
ourselves to distinguish what we can change in ourselves and in the 
external circumstances that have shaped us [and] we must realize 
what we have to accept as inevitable" (69). In other words, the way 
to authenticity is to negotiate the blizzard of living's experiences, 
feelings and ideas by remaining in touch with the inner life, listen-
ing to its dictates and molding our values and beliefs in accord with 
it. The ethical decisions we might make are of importance primarily 
for their constancy in support of the project, but there is no single, 
given way in which the uniqueness of our individuality might express 
itself—merely a series of challenges that must be overcome in the 
interests of self-congruence. As Golomb comments: "It follows that 
within the framework of Nietzschean philosophy we cannot speak 
about authentic character or self. Authenticity is a predicate not of 
character or of the self, but merely of acts and pathos" (82).
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These brief explications of the philosophical coordinates of au-
thenticity clearly overlap and have crossfertilized, but both models 
have currency in the work of Hall and McCarthy where their contra-
dictory imperatives between being and becoming lead ultimately to 
the flight from subjectivity. The resilience of self-posited authenticity 
in contemporary writing is hardly surprising, given the Nietzschean 
inheritance in poststructuralist and postmodern theory and the 
fashionable skepticism toward the universalising absolutism of any 
subjectivity, but it is notable that the return of the real in the late-
twentieth and twenty-first centuries has brought with it a reengage-
ment with the viability of the biological ideal. Whether the kernel of 
wholeness can be recuperated, or must always remain chimerical, 
is as unresolved now as it ever was, but recent writing has evinced 
the desire for some accommodation of the self-identical and the 
self-fashioned subjects. Remainder and The Raw Shark Texts—both 
experimental, post-trauma fictions whose authors have been schooled 
in the discursive, metapractices of postmodernism—toy with the 
mutual compatibility of biological and self-posited authenticity, and 
though neither is ultimately comfortable rescinding the self-reflexivity 
of the deconstructed subject, neither are they willing to dispense 
totally with the idea of the irreducible self.
Both novels share a view that the integrity of the individual as 
autonomous, self-determining agent is tied to a pathos of harmo-
nious being-in-the world. But they equally share the fear that the 
expression of that agency is problematised by discourses of social 
and cultural conditioning that shadow each action or ethical choice 
with the inauthenticity of the precursory echo. Of course, the story 
of existentialist authenticity from Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Rousseau 
to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre has been dominated by anxiety 
over the deauthenticating effect of social influence, but the cur-
rent incarnation of the debate is complicated by postmodernism's 
triumphing of the inauthentic, the fake, the parodic, the reproduc-
ible as an aesthetic response to the exhaustion of representation. 
The central protagonists of both novels are painfully conscious of 
the provisionality of their places within the symbolic order and are 
enmeshed in the matrices of representational exchange to such an 
extent that they struggle to articulate themselves as anything other 
than reproductions. For McCarthy's unnamed narrator, authenticity 
can only be experienced as intangibility, the fleeting apperception 
of a transcendent core not just to selfhood, but also to life itself. His 
motivating desire is: "to be real—to become fluent, natural, to cut 
out the detour that sweeps us around what's fundamental to events, 
preventing us from touching their core: the detour that makes us all 
second-hand and second-rate" (244). The explicit value judgement in 
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the second-rate-ness of inauthenticity implies McCarthy's discomfort 
with postmodernism's ludic self-reflexivity, and his confidence in a 
core that renders matters "fundamental" suggests his writing back to 
older traditions of phenomenology. Hall's Eric Sanderson expresses a 
similar frustration with the elusiveness of his own internal constancy: 
"I'd been a flat thing, something I always mistook for a shadow, but 
maybe the eroding effect of events had begun weathering me out of 
the ground, revealing new surfaces and edges. Can nothing really 
be scraped away the same way that something can?" (232). Though 
the metaphor here is archaeological rather than orbital, Hall articu-
lates the same desire for the "thing" itself, not merely a pathos of 
subjectivity, but a palpable haecceity. 
While Remainder's narrator and Eric Sanderson express a 
deep-rooted desire for being and acting authentically, and although 
both locate their nebulous sense of the authentic within the "heroic 
idea of coinciding with oneself and one's deepest needs or impulses" 
(Williams 184) that I am affiliating here with the biological tradition, 
the former locates it primarily as a spatial paradigm, while Hall's 
character understands it within a linear narrative register. Indeed, for 
McCarthy, the coincidence with self can only be articulated through 
the confluence of material and immaterial realms. Recovering the 
memory of his home in an apartment block is an epiphany of heimlich 
belonging and intentionality:
Most of all I remembered this: that inside this remembered 
building, in the rooms and on the staircase, in the lobby and 
in the large courtyard between it and the building facing 
with the red roofs with the black cats on them – that in these 
spaces, all my movements had been fluent and unforced. 
Not awkward, acquired, second-hand, but natural. Opening 
my fridge's door, lighting a cigarette, even lifting a carrot 
to my mouth: these gestures had been seamless, perfect. 
I'd merged with them, run through them and let them run 
through me until there'd been no space between us. They'd 
been real; I'd been real– been without first understanding 
how to try to be . . . (62)
The concomitance of materiality and experience of self here situates 
the authentic as a phenomenological quintessence, a compacting of 
the space between self and thing. The narrator makes the assump-
tion that the authentic is a consummation of external naturalness 
with a form of internal perceptive flow that transcends the need for 
contemplation by accessing a state of pure being. The thus-ness of 
the fridge door, the way that Robert de Niro might light a cigarette, or 
the crack in the wall plaster that the narrator remembers (and tries to 
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recreate) so intimately, speak of an order of veracity and inevitability 
that he cannot match in the act of living but is continually striving for 
as a confirmation of his being. In the process of creating the Platonic 
ideal of his past, the narrator experiences micromoments of perfect 
convergence where the consciousness of existence falls away, and 
he is left in a condition of messianic transportation: "Remembering it 
[the accident] sent a tingling from the top of my legs to my shoulders 
and right up into my neck. It lasted for just a moment—but while it 
did I felt not-neutral. I felt different, intense: both intense and serene 
at the same time. I remember feeling this way very well: standing 
there, passive, with my palms turned outwards, feeling intense and 
serene (11)." ."Serene" appears as the descriptor of this embodied 
authenticity again later in the novel (204), and the image that he 
projects of himself—static, accepting, with palms turned outward—
suggests both openness to the connectivity of the moment and a 
Christ-like gesture of entreaty. It is a sensation that he describes 
elsewhere as a "calm contentedness" (138), and it is in these rare 
moments of transcendent being, when he feels instrumental to the 
moment, that he comes closest to achieving a form of authenticity 
as an experience of immanence. 
As the obsessive nature of the narrator's project develops, and 
as his mental condition deteriorates, the transcendence of the mate-
rial plane becomes his driving motivation. Two moments stand out in 
this regard: firstly, when he becomes fascinated by the chores carried 
out at a small garage, and secondly, when he attempts to recreate 
what he assumes to be a gangland murder. In the first instance, the 
seemingly routine task of renewing his car's washer fluid becomes a 
moment of material commutation when the liquid appears magically 
to disappear before gushing out of the dashboard. The narrator's 
transport of delight at this apparent dematerialisation centers on the 
momentary uncoupling of stuff from the laws of matter; the mundane 
seems through a process of transubstantiation to have become im-
material, leaving no remainder. The subsequent revelation of the fault 
in the vehicle's plumbing system repudiates this miracle and throws 
the narrator back into the state of rational physics that he associ-
ates with inauthenticity. The second example reveals his increasing 
inability to distinguish between enactment and reenactment as he 
choreographs life's final moments in an attempt to achieve a form 
of authentic being-toward-death. By reenacting the experience of 
the victim of a killing as he faces the unavoidability of his demise, 
the narrator hopes for atranscendence in space to where living and 
dead matter coincide:
It may have been clumsy to fall from his bike, but in dy-
ing besides the bollards on the tarmac he'd done what I 
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wanted to do: merged with the space around him, sunk 
and flowed into it until there was no distance between it 
and him – and merged too, with his actions, merged to 
the extent of having no more consciousness of them. He'd 
stopped being separate, removed, imperfect. . . . Then 
both mind and actions had resolved themselves into pure 
stasis. The spot that this had happened on was the ground 
zero of perfection—all perfection. (184–185) 
If one understands the authentic as a pathos of coalescence, then 
such reenactments are attempts to access the authentic through 
the profoundly inauthentic process of endless recreation, robbing 
the moment of its spontaneity through forensic aestheticisation and 
examination. Analyzing an experience of haecceity in minute detail 
profoundly dehumanizes and denaturalizes the event, reducing it to 
its signifying constituents, but it is only in this disarticulation that 
the narrator is able to identify any transubstantiation between the 
material and the immaterial. Lying on the ground, imagining the world 
from the perspective of another, enables his sensation of connected-
ness not only to the consciousness of another person, but also to the 
substrata of the material world. The realness for which he strives 
can be perceived through the slow-motion deconstruction of events, 
but its quality is fundamentally scenographic and the authenticity 
attained is always troubled by the taint of a residual inauthenticity.
McCarthy's work with the art and philosophical collective, the 
International Necronautical Society (INS), has focused on this re-
sidual inauthenticity as an indicator of the failure of artistic creation 
to achieve transcendence. At the heart of McCarthy's interest in the 
idea of authenticity as it relates to the concerns of the INS is the idea 
that death is a space beyond the human and yet inextricably underlies 
the experience of subjectivity and the relationship to representation.
The failing of art is its inability to transcend either death or itself. 
The traumatized repetition that is involved in the creative process, 
and in the reenactment in which the narrator of Remainder indulges, 
is circumscribed by the materiality of matter and its attachment to 
the world of concrete phenomena. The narrator is engaged in a vain 
attempt to master his self, to be individual rather than dividual, 
to cohere singularly rather than recognize the constant process of 
splitting that constitutes subjectivity. His attempts to reconstruct 
unreliable memories and reenact the coalescence of the sublime 
moment of individuation all fail in the face of the materiality of mat-
ter. There is always "a remainder that remains: a shard, a leftover, 
a trace, a residual" and this remainder is the "mark of inauthentic-
ity" (Schwenger). The narrator expresses his desire for a totalizing, 
mystical transcendence in moments such as those discussed above, 
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a perfect coincidence of self with un-self, yet in each case, the tran-
scendence is denied—experience is inauthentic because it remains 
within the phenomenal.From the Necronautical perspective, this 
failure to transcend becomes the motivating imperative for rejecting 
singularity and embracing the constant splitting of self into matter. 
Matter, and its valorization, becomes the focus, and the emphasis 
on its imperfection the means to articulate the subject's lack of core.
For these reasons, the project enacted in Remainder—that of 
reconstituting the authentic self through an act of imaginative re-
membering—dwells in the arena of art and self-fashioning, and might 
thus be seen to fit more closely within the self-posited model of au-
thenticity proposed earlier. The narrator's conscious and painstaking 
self-recreation does not negate the possibility of an inner core, nor 
does it illegitimize the profundity of his epiphanies of belonging, but 
it does imply that the path to authenticity for the postdeconstructive 
and posttraumatic subject involves the intricate micromanagement of 
the aestheticized object of the self. Cleaving the component actions 
of a self together in the shape of authentic identity requires the ethi-
cal constancy, moral alertness, and artistic objectivity that Nietzsche 
believes crucial to the process of self-overcoming, and Remainder's 
narratorial figure works hard to batten down the connective elements 
of his subjectivity. However, the supplementarity that haunts the novel 
in the forms of remainders, residues, shards, and bits would seem to 
undermine the possibility of that self-overcoming being productive of 
a coherent selfhood in the way that Nietzsche imagines.
The remainder—that which cannot be assimilated into the 
biological or self-posited authentic—is encapsulated in the motif of 
the figure eight and its correlative to infinity in the symbol ∞. This 
pattern features prominently in the £8.5 million sum that the nar-
rator receives in compensation for the accident that motivates the 
narrative and is repeated in various guises throughout the novel.
The integrity of the unbroken loop of infinity strongly suggests the 
perfection of the authenticity that the narrator seeks, a closed circuit 
that refers to nothing outside itself and yet sustains its own energy. 
However, the simplicity of the figure eight is complicated by the .5 
supplement that attaches itself to his bank account, but also to his 
psychological make-up: "The eight was perfect, neat: a curved figure 
infinitely turning back into itself. But then the half. Why had they 
added the half? It seemed to me so messy, this half: a leftover frag-
ment, a shard of detritus" (9)" The financial settlement is supposed 
to be the thing that "would make me better, whole, complete" (6), 
some kind of complement to counterbalance the erasure of the past, 
and yet he is constantly troubled by the remainder. The .5 is surplus 
matter that stubbornly will not resolve itself into something whole. 
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As the novel draws to its close, the figure is iterated once again as 
the aeroplane that the narrator and Naz have charted to flee the 
reenacted-heist-turned-real adopts a pattern of back and forth looping 
as the narrative rests inconclusively between escape and retribution. 
This final image of wholeness is undercut, as is every other example 
in the text, with the failure of transcendence and a pained skepti-
cism toward the possibility of authenticity as anything other than a 
momentary appearance of self-coherence. Consequently, McCarthy 
leaves his reader with a disconcerting sense that both models of au-
thenticity are simultaneously plausible and implausible. Where the 
inherence of biological authenticity fails the test of its own interiority, 
so self-posited authenticity fails the test of artistic transcendence. 
And yet neither is dismissed by the novel as a fantasy; indeed, both 
are presented as somehow irreducibly part of the human condition, 
without which the concept of subjectivity is fatally impoverished.
McCarthy's uncertainty about the metaphysical credibility of 
authenticity in the age of the postdeconstructed subject is echoed in 
Hall's discomfort with the impact of technological homogenization on 
the status of human uniqueness. A considerably warmer novel than 
Remainder, The Raw Shark Texts nevertheless displays an anxiety 
about the meaning of authenticity in the relationship between the 
human and the machine. Where McCarthy plays with the philo-
sophical landscape of the authentic in the manner of the modernist 
avant-garde he emulates, Hall's work elicits a genuine anxiety that 
the subject cannot cohere in the face of digital reproducibility and is 
consequently threated by obsolescence. Where the objective detach-
ment of McCarthy's anonymous narrator endows his self-projection 
with a crystallizing security, the metaphysical uncertainty of Eric 
Sanderson reveals a deep apprehension about the imperialistic asser-
tion of selfhood. Like McCarthy, Hall posits both models of authentic 
expressivism with which we have been playing, and is seemingly 
convinced that the interiorized, biological spirit is a nostalgic myth 
and that the idea of the subject is formed and maintained through 
the frameworks of information that surround us and the cultural 
typologies that we mimic. The awareness that the subject is con-
stituted predominantly, and primarily, from the outside suggests an 
affinity of outlook between Hall and McCarthy, but at the heart of the 
narrative is Eric's faith that the inside means something; there is a 
faith here despite the evidence. The kernel of the self cannot be so 
categorically dismissed. 
Eric Sanderson—or, the Second Eric Sanderson, as he is consis-
tently described in the novel—is a simulacrum, a shadow of the first 
Eric who has disappeared and yet relates gnomically with his alter-
ego through letters and coded communiqués, designed to keep him 
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from the grasp of the conceptual Thought Shark who may, or may 
not have, consumed the first Eric. Crucially, then, the Second Eric is 
always symbolically posthumous, trailing his antecedent in search of 
answers. The mental fugue that has wiped his memory at the nar-
rative's opening positions him as a tabula rasa requiring inscription 
to locate himself within his own subjectivity. Yet, Eric's selfhood is 
always provisional, contingent on filling the knowledge gaps left by 
the first, and implicitly authentic, Eric. Only by narrowing the distance 
between original and reproduction can Eric overcome his belief that 
"I am in a constant collapse"(207). His fears of emptiness, lack and 
meaninglessness dominate the early sections of the book where his 
posteriority qualifies everything to do with his ontological status, so 
that "searching around inside my head, feeling through the black 
for any familiar shape. . . . it was all just cobwebs and shadows; I 
couldn't find myself in there either" (5). The existential blankness that 
substitutes for a core leads to the anxious "It isn't coming back to 
me. I don't know any of this at all" (4), a cry that focalises interiority 
as a presupposed point of orientation. Robbed of these coordinates, 
Eric tries, like Remainder's narrator, to reconstruct memory bridges 
to his physical surroundings, striving to reconnect with the object 
world as if it contains an immanence of remembered attachment:
I started off gently in the living room, picking things up, 
looking at them, trying to form some sort of connection; 
taking the time to read the title of every book in the book-
case, swapping a few around so the existing order became 
my random order; going through the papers in the maga-
zine rack; getting on my knees and looking at the wires 
coming out of the back of the TV and at the dust and chips 
on the skirting boards. Trying to get intimate, make the 
space familiar from every angle. (19–20)
Material reality provides him with no empathic feedback and he is 
left pressed up against the door of an inexplicably locked room in 
his house, dislocated as much from the idea of himself as from any 
physical link to a self-identity. His severance from the narrative of 
selfhood begs questions of being, but more insistently, it begs ques-
tions of knowing, and it is these elusive epistemological issues that 
drive the novel in search of answers. While earlier, I established that 
McCarthy's narrator understands his authenticity through his relation 
to space, it is clear for Eric that the restoration of a unifying narrative 
is the only path to reconnecting with his former, more authentic, self. 
Recovering the grail of authenticity demands a quest in search 
of Trey Fidorous, but what must be reiterated at this point is that 
this quest supposes the givenness of a self-congruent identity; 
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though lost, there is always the possibility that it can be refound. 
This suggests that we are working within a biological paradigm of 
authenticity, and there are numerous metaphors of containment, 
immanence, storage, and isolation to indicate Hall's commitment 
to such a model. The chimera of spirit is embodied, for example, 
in the two rooms that Eric regards as offering answers to his many 
questions: the locked room in his house and the first Eric's room 
in Fidorous' paper burrow.These spaces initially seem to offer the 
prospect of resolution, but when he is finally able to access them, all 
they present him with are series of codes that need to be interpreted, 
and can thus only be read as epistemological deferrals. Deferral is, 
of course, generically structural to the quest narrative, but it is also 
fundamental to the novel's hermeneutic play through the QWERTY 
code in which the Light Bulb Fragment is couched. This code, which 
seems to hide the secret of the first Eric's disappearance, is based 
on the multiple combinations of proximate letters on a computer 
keyboard, and, given that any letter in the code has eight possible 
variations, meaning can only be gleaned through a tortuous series of 
deferrals and refinements based on cumulative sense making. As the 
code explains: "clean text cannot be constructed at the level of the 
individual letter. Possible translations must be constructed at word 
level, re-evaluated at sentence level and refined at paragraph level" 
(75). Once this outer encryption is resolved, a secondary deferral 
takes place as another code is plotted within QWERTY. The deferral 
of information leads ultimately to the deferral of narrative and the 
truth about the first Eric is never fully divulged.
The provisional status of encoded information extends to the 
novel's conceptualisation of disembodied identity. The opening para-
graphs describing Eric's return to consciousness are dominated by 
the dissociation of his mind and body: he speaks about "the engines 
and drivers that keep the human machine functioning at a mechanical 
level" trip-switching to bring him back to "emergency manual over-
ride" (4). Later in the novel he laments feeling "so fucking tired of 
endless hours of doing my shitty best to cling my component parts 
together as a human being" (99), another construction that belies the 
idea of a ghost in this particular machine. This is in evidence again 
when Eric contemplates how the cycle of cell growth and death ren-
ders the body a site of continuous change, refuting at the molecular 
level the notion of contiguity that underlies the biological metaphor 
of authenticity. Rather than envisioning the human body as greater 
than the sum of its parts, The Raw Shark Texts dismantles it to 
reveal the mechanisms—organic, but programed nonetheless—that 
configure the human shape. Those mechanisms are little more than 
encoded information that, like the text's literary codes, depend on 
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adjacent components for meaning and order: in themselves they are 
freestanding memes. This is brought into sharp focus during Eric's 
confrontation with Mr Nobody, whose name gestures toward his lack 
of corporeal being, and who literally begins to deliquesce once the 
pills that he takes to maintain his form begin to lose effectiveness. 
When Eric later examines Nobody's belongings, he discovers bottles 
containing the synthesised elements of a personality: "STYLE. EX-
TRAPOLATION. CONVICTION. FRIENDLY SMILE. POWERS OF PERSUA-
SION … CONCERN. SURPRISE. SUSPICION. DIGNITY" (177). Nobody 
is the quintessence of externality, but his immateriality is exemplary 
of Hall's fear of the human being's status as a core-less performance. 
After all, as Eric remarks: "A concept wrapped in skin and chemicals. 
. . . That sounds like a human being to me" (178).
What I am arguing, therefore, is that although the novel seems 
to favor the notion of the authentic self as a focus of desire, it also 
presents a radical skepticism to the very idea of any part of that self 
being internally reliable or integral.The mythology of authenticity 
aside, the self in the age of mass mediation and communication is 
indistinguishable from, and completely reliant on, the technological 
code it uses to articulate its presence in the material world. The Raw 
Shark Texts may be a paean for the interiorised humanist spirit, 
but there is a recognition that this is a fantasy in an era of mass 
informational transfer; the subject exists increasingly as a node on 
a network, and while that might not supplant the desire for authen-
ticity and distinction, it does suggest that identity has become little 
more than programed software, the body simply a device for stor-
ing and transmitting code. This cyborg tendency is expressed most 
clearly in the megalomaniacal supra-subjectivity of Mycroft Ward. 
Ward, the novel's nemesis and generator of the Thought Shark that 
pursues Eric, is the ultimate example of a human being understood 
as a computer program—he is software endlessly reduplicated into 
human hardware. Originating as a means of cheating decay and 
death, Ward's project is to transmit his identity into the body of 
another by duplicating the building blocks of consciousness. This 
aspiration soon encompasses several bodies and, eventually, in the 
age of computerised interconnectivity, innumerable participants. The 
system he has created for his immortality has to replicate itself for 
"the irresistible urge to survive led to an equally irresistible urge to 
grow" (203). Formatted as a form of aggressive personality virus 
that sustains itself on the thought processes of others and feeds back 
useful information to the central "server," Mycroft Ward is able, as a 
result of constant technologized informational transfer, to grow itself 
exponentially, perpetually looping back, reinforcing itself and resisting 
disintegration. The voracious insatiability of Ward's viral immortality 
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begs the question of whether the cloning of personality into endless, 
contiguous thought systems represents the apotheosis of an authentic 
identity—infinitely digitisable, replicable, and sharable—or whether it 
is the ultimate destruction of the notion of identity as an owned and 
private singularity. Where human identity is inextricably tied to hu-
man time—that is, it relies on time to evolve and develop, for skills to 
manifest themselves and be perfected—the digital identity, or identity 
as software, is boundless because it abides by the logic of computer 
time and because the proliferation of simulacral identities can result 
in an unlimited and instantaneous proliferation in data production.
If human identity can be equated with encoded information 
that can be downloaded on a processing mainframe, then, the novel 
suggests, the concept of unique, embodied authenticity can only be 
regarded as a secondary effect. Much in The Raw Shark Texts points 
to the occlusion of the subject by the informational detritus that 
swamps them.The hermeneutic dependence of the narrative on tex-
tual precursors such as Frankenstein, House of Leaves, Casablanca, 
The Wizard of Oz, The Matrix and, Jaws mirrors, on a macro level, 
the routine enacting of familiar fictional scenarios by the novel's 
players. Structurally and imagistically, there is a recognizability to 
everything that occurs in the novel that speaks to its interest not 
only in textual recycling, but also the endless circuitry of cultural 
information. All the characters are types, but more importantly, they 
are nodes in a representational feedback loop that they perpetuate 
and through which they inscribe themselves. Even without having 
been subsumed by the Ward virus, they continuously cycle data as 
part of their conception of themselves as individuals. To some degree, 
Hall is playing here with the model of self-positing, but importantly 
there is the recognition that the experiences that are to be shaped 
are always already valenced within other representational orders and 
thus speak less to self-overcoming through aesthetic discrimination 
than to the human identity as a conduit for social and cultural traffic. 
Hall's intervention on self-posited authenticity centers particu-
larly on the surfeit of information that characterizes the digital age. In 
a moment of heavy symbolic resonance, Eric observes a rain-swollen 
river bursting its banks and rendering the surrounding countryside 
a seething mass:
Everything beyond the gateposts was furious: a river gone 
gigantic and deformed and crazy, banks burst and out on 
a greedy, rolling brown rampage. The size and force of it 
overloaded me, made me feel sick and dizzy. A too much-
ness. . . . No boundaries. The river was here reaching and 
grabbing and actually pulling at my feet and calves with a 
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beautiful, mindless ache. A willpower in pressure. The river 
wanting to drag me off and smash me up and remake me 
as part of its pointless and stupidly powerful and passion-
ate drive to change and obliteration. (98)
The vertiginous sensation generated in Eric by this indistinction 
destabilizes him because it is experienced as a sublime excess; the 
sheer surplus of the river momentarily robs his consciousness of the 
ability to judge the fixed from the flow. And the threat posed by this 
"too muchness" is palpable as his feet begin to give way under the 
current, a potent metaphorical articulation of the insignificance of 
the individual within the inexorable flood of data that characterizes 
contemporaneity. Within this technological sublime, the viability of 
the individual as authentically and harmoniously formed monad is, 
at best drastically reduced, and at worst, untenable. For all his mel-
ancholic wistfulness for the ghost in the machine, the irreducible and 
time-transcending self, Hall ultimately regards such conceptions as 
a romantic ideal in an age where the human has become little more 
than a fleshly interface for the free circling of data. Under such con-
ditions, the notion of psychological coherence and authenticity are 
unsustainable and the very idea of the novel as the preeminent literary 
form for expressing character development becomes compromised. 
The metafictional elements of The Raw Shark Texts—most notably 
the flick-book stylisation of the Thought Shark's attack—counterbal-
ance the realist, psychodrama of Eric's mental breakdown, but as it 
moves toward its disconnected conclusion, culminating in pictorial 
clues to his fate, the idea of this novel as a Bildungsroman is finally 
discredited. Hall's point is that there can be no satisfying conclusion 
to Eric's search for his former self because the self as expressivist 
whole is a fantasy. We are thus intended to read the final pages of 
disarticulated evidence as suggestive, but fundamentally aporetic 
flotsam washed up from the wreckage of Eric's subjective breakdown. 
Despite disavowing the concept of character development, Hall 
engineers the reader's sympathy for Eric in a way that cannot be 
said for Remainder's narrator. That connection should not, however, 
disguise the fact that The Raw Shark Texts is harsher in its estimation 
of the possibility of authenticity than McCarthy's. The conclusion that 
the subject is constituted predominantly from the outside is similar 
to McCarthy's portrayal of the self as an artistic self-construction. But 
there is a greater anxiety that the individual in no way controls that 
process—that the central constitution of the self has been taken over 
by technology. The aesthetic self-assembly project is thus not tenable 
in Hall's world because the ubiquity of multiply-used information so 
intimately infiltrates the idea of self before the project could begin. 
Thus, in some ways, Hall's thinking is more radical than McCarthy's, 
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for where the latter believes that the self can form itself from a space 
of stasis, the former understands the movement of self-formation as 
directed by the energy of informational transfer. Ultimately, where 
McCarthy believes that both models of authenticity are possible, Hall 
is convinced that neither is.
Though both McCarthy and Hall are heavily influenced by the 
aesthetic and philosophical horizons of poststructuralist postmodern-
ism, both reveal in their engagement with authenticity a nostalgia 
for a Romantic tradition that, for all its unfashionable assumptions 
about the self, cannot be entirely dismissed as outdated or unself-
conscious. The resilience of the idea of authenticity, its reemergence 
as a fictional trope in the dog-days of postmodernist experimentalism, 
suggests a willingness to move the debates about subjective experi-
ence onto new terrain. While that terrain may initially appear to have 
already been fully covered, McCarthy and Hall are representatives of 
a widespread movement in contemporary British writing that tackles 
an antihumanist politics not through the return to traditional models 
of narrative realism and character development, but through com-
bative amalgamation of discursive experimentalism, metaphysical 
reflection, and wit. That neither can wholeheartedly assert the return 
of the subject from its deconstructive exile is unimportant, but the 
fact that both attest to the value of the authentic as the cornerstone 
of subjectivity in the twenty-first century may well be a significant 
development in contemporary literary studies.
Note
1. For comprehensive discussion of the philosophical history of authen-
ticity see: Golomb, Guignon, Taylor (Ethics), and Trilling.
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